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N.N. PETRUKHINTSEV, Vnutrennaia politika Anny Ioannovny (1730‑1740) [Anna
Ioannovna’s domestic policy (1730‑1740)], Moscow : Rosspen, 2014, 1063 p.
1 In recent years Russian historians have filled in many of the gaping holes in Russian
historiography. One of the chronological gaps is the years in the eighteenth century
between the death of Peter the Great and the beginning of the reign of Catherine the
Great. The decade and a half after Peter’s death is particularly critical because it saw
the consolidation of his work and the failure of almost all attempts to revise it. Nikolai
Petrukhintsev’s remarkable study of the 1730’s, encyclopedic in its scope, goes a long
way toward filling this gap. It is a fundamental work, and will require much thought
and discussion to be assimilated into our conceptions of eighteenth century Russia.
2 The reign of Anna Ioannovna, Peter’s niece, has been studied primarily for the failed
attempt of the aristocrats in the Supreme Privy Council to establish an oligarchy in the
place of autocracy in 1730. That attempt was a classic subject for pre‑revolutionary
liberal historians and their opponents, producing a rather anachronistic history that
tried to fit the conflict into later ideas of constitutional government. This approach
lasted in the West through the twentieth century. In recent years Petrukhintsev and
I.V. Kurukin, among others, have brought new light to the 1730 events as well as the
entire decade. Kurukin has contributed a fresh and much more convincing account of
those  events,  while  Petrukhintsev  has  devoted  his  efforts  to  the  ensuing  decade,
N.N. Petrukhintsev, Vnutrennaia politika Anny Ioannovny (1730‑1740), [Anna Io...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/4 | 2015
1
primarily the history of the army and navy.1 Building on his earlier work, he has now
produced a definite story of the main features of the “domestic policy” of Empress
Anna and her government. What he means by that, as he explains, is not a modern,
written,  and  thought  out  program  but  a  series  of  measures  that  were  strongly
interconnected though the ruling elite probably did not understand them as a system
(96).
3 Petrukhintsev shows that Anna and her ministers inherited a discussion about what to
do about Peter’s legislation that began immediately after his death. The problem was
that many of the new institutions were expensive, especially local administration and
the  navy,  and the  new rulers,  whether  Menshikov or  the  future  oligarchs  of  1730,
thought that the resulting tax burden was too great. The vicissitudes of court politics in
1725‑30, however, meant that the attention of the ruling elite was focused more on
intrigues and maneuvers at court. After Anna’s restoration of autocracy in February,
1730, the government could turn to implementing basic measures. The “autocracy” of
Anna, to be sure, was scarcely personal rule, as the Cabinet and Senate did most of the
work. These were small bodies : the Cabinet consisted only of Andrei Ostermann, prince
A.M. Cherkasskii,  count  G.I. Golokin  (to  1735),  and  later  P.I. Iaguzhinskii  and
A.P. Volynskii.  The Senate  had  about  twelve  members  for  most  of  the  reign.
Petrukhintsev is not writing a history of court politics, however, and in his new book
we see the Cabinet and Senate setting policy and administrative practice throughout
the empire.  He describes the roles of  the various individuals (and favorites such as
Ernst Johann von Biron), but as ministers of state, not as plotters of intrigues around
the empress.
4 The activities  of  Anna’s  government were many,  and Petrukhintsev has covered an
enormous range of topics, some of them in great depth. He begins by surveying the first
two years as the government tried to implement the proposals to lighten the burden
that were formed soon after Peter’s death. He covers the status of the gentry, monetary
policy,  administrative  staff  reductions,  and  commerce,  as  well  as  the  response  to
famine in 1733‑1735 (17‑206). He then moves on to policies on the frontiers of Russia,
the Ukrainian hetmanate and the southern Russian provinces, followed by an extensive
account  of  Bashkiria  and  a  brief  survey  of  the  Baltic  provinces  (where  very  little
happened  that  was  new).  The  last  third  of  the  book  describes  the  effects  of  the
Russo‑Turkish  war  of  1735‑1740  on  the  country  and  the  related  problems  of  the
development of the iron and steel industry.
5 It  is  difficult  to  do  justice  to  a  book  of  this  breadth  and  richness.  Petrukhintsev’s
description of  the  government’s  policies  on the  southern frontier  stresses  that  the
framework  was  not  just  the  Ukrainian  Hetmanate,  but  the  whole  of  the  frontier
(222‑381).  It  was not a matter of nationality, as the policies were similar across the
whole area and designed to strengthen defenses while holding down the costs. They
also  sought  to  make  the  burden  not  equal,  but  equitable,  among  the  various
communites.  These  policies  did  affect  the  Hetmanate,  the  Sloboda  Ukraine,  and
southern Russian areas according to their specific status. In particular the Hetmanate
and Sloboda were not subject to the “soul tax” of the central provinces until 1783, and
Petrukhintsev provides a detailed account of the evolution of the central government’s
fiscal policies in those areas. For the Russian inhabitants of the southern provinces, the
expansion of the Landmilitsiia laid an extra burden of military service. The hope here
was to reduce the military budget by shifting expenses onto the southern odnodvortsy.
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Prince A.I. Shakhovskoi was the most important of the Russian officials in the area until
his death in 1736, and Petrukhintsev sees him as cautious, trying to keep the southern
frontier defenses in good shape but careful of local autonomies. Unfortunately all of the
southern border regions were especially hard hit by the Russo‑Turkish war, as they
were  a  staging  area  for  the  army  and  its  ill‑fated  (and  in  Petrukhintsev’s  view)
ill‑conceived  campaign  of  General‑Field  Marshall  Count  B.  C.  von  Münnich  against
Crimea. Requisitioning horses and oxen needed to transport supplies for the army was
disastrous to the Ukrainian peasant economy. Ironically Count Peter von Lacy’s capture
of  Azov  was  the  only  success  of  the  war,  bought  at  much  less  cost.  Curiously,
Petrukhintsev says little about the Don Cossacks.
6 In contrast,  Russian policy in Bashkiria was more of a nationality issue, though the
by‑product  of  more  far‑reaching  plans  (382‑634).  Here  the  villain  was  I.K. Kirillov,
ober‑sekretar´ of  the  Senate,  who  constructed  a  project  shaped  by  Russia’s  new
westernized  culture.  Kirillov  had  already  been  involved  in  the  planning  of  Vitus
Bering’s Second Kamchatka Expedition, where one of the side‑shows was a ruthless
attempt at new forms of exploitation of the native peoples of northeast Siberia. In 1734
he presented a proposal to the government to expand Russian trade with Central Asia
by establishing a commercial center to be called Orenburg in the southern Urals, the
area traditionally occupied by the Bashkirs. Empress Anna accepted the proposal and
ordered it to be carried out.2 In it Kirillov cited the example of the Iberian empires in
the New World, great producers of silver and other riches for their royal masters. He
thought that the gold of Badakhshan (in modern Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan)
would bring similar treasure to Russia. He wanted to eventually cross the steppe into
Central Asia, capture Badakhshan, and also make of it a waystation on the road to the
final goal, India. The first step in this fantastic plan was the construction of the new
city. His Orenburg was to duplicate the success of Batavia in the Dutch East Indies, cited
as the example to be followed, no matter that Orenburg was not on the sea but at the
northern fringe of the Kazakh steppe. Kirillov was dreaming of Indian riches, and the
Bashkirs seemed a minor obstacle to which he gave little thought. The problem was
that his new city would close off the Bashkir nomads to the southeast and also place
Russian administrators closer to the population, inevitably restricting the power of the
local elites. The result was a revolt. Kirillov responded by realizing the Bashkirs’ worst
fears,  trying to give some Bashkir lands to the Tatars,  to replace the nomadic clan
structure with elected elders, and to restrict the numbers of the Muslim ulema. His
accompanying brutality and arrogance fueled what became the largest and bloodiest of
the Bashkir revolts. Kirillov and his lieutenants, such as the Tatar murza A.I. Tevkelev,
distinguished themselves by ineffective cruelty. Fortunately Kirillov died in 1737, and it
was left to V.N. Tatishchev and the Russian army to finish off the revolt and reset the
government’s course in a way more favorable to the Bashkirs. The resultant portrait of
Kirillov  is  quite  far  from  the  optimistic  account  of  the  self‑taught  statistician  and
geographer in the older Russian and Western literature and more like a character from
Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness.3 The result is also a new picture of the Bashkir revolt,
one in which the cause was not general “oppression” but a very specific attempt to
restrict local autonomy. In Petrukhintsev’s view this was the normal reason for revolts
on the periphery (436).
7 One of the main objects of concern to Anna’s government was the mines and factories
in  the  Urals  that  produced  iron  and  copper.  Russia  had  produced  both  in  the
seventeenth century, mostly from rural craft industries but also in and around Tula, in
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factories  run  by  Russian  merchants  as  well  as  the  Marselis  family.  Peter’s  army,
however, needed much more and higher quality metal for artillery, muskets, the navy,
and other uses, so he sponsored the expansion of the mines and factories by the state,
all them eventually falling under his Berg‑kollegiia. Petrukhintsev chronicles their fate
from that moment on to 1740, in the process giving a fresh account of an old subject
(802‑940).4 The stimulation of production by the state was not an end in itself. Peter
already began to “privatize” some of the factories, and this process went on into the
1730’s. For the Russian government the deciding factor was the contracts it made with
English merchants to export large quantities of iron, essentially a fiscal measure to
swell  the  treasury  with  profits  from  iron  exports.  To  fulfill  the  contract  the
Berg‑kollegiia sent Tatishchev to the Urals to improve and expand the state factories,
which he  did  with great  success,  in  five  years  setting up more  factories  than ever
before. Tatishchev was not, however, a principled supporter of government enterprise
over private. He favored a combination of government stimulation but also believed
that the dominant merchant clans, most prominently the Demidovs and Stroganovs,
should continue to own, finance, and run the factories.  While Tatishchev had great
success  in  the  Urals,  events  elsewhere  gave  him  doubts.  In  1738‑40  a  Saxon  mine
administrator in Russian service, Curt Alexander von Schönberg, tried to get control of
alleged silver and copper sources in Lappland. The mines turned out to be worthless,
but  the  Schönberg  affair  demonstrated  the  vast  possibilities  of  corruption in  deals
between the state and merchant mine owners.  Petrukhintsev sees Tatishchev as an
excessive “rationalist” in his approach because of his penchant for excessively neat
formal administrative structures, but he emerges from this account as a talented and
learned  administrator.  Perhaps  he  was  not  the  titan  of  the  older  literature,  but
successful enough to fully merit his place in the history of the Urals and its industries. 
8 The book devotes nearly two hundred pages to the effects of the Russo‑Turkish war on
a variety of policies beyond the southern border (635‑801). The reader learns of the
attempts to recruit surplus clergy for the army, the effect of the mobilization of horses
and men, taxation and commercial policy, all distorted to a greater or lesser extent by
the war. This is a pioneering move, for the many wars of eighteenth century Russia are
a well‑known part of its history, but how they were financed and supplied, and what
were the effects on society and the state has not been the subject of much attention.
Indeed the Turkish war dominates the whole book, for it came into nearly every area of
Russian policy directly or indirectly.
9 Petrukhintsev  concludes  with  a  brief  narrative  of  the  intrigues  at  court  in  the
government at the end of the reign. It is one of his contentions that these intrigues,
famous from historical novels and biographies, were not so important in setting policy
until the very end. His prosopography of the main officials (140‑166) is useful, but for
Biron and the chief decision makers the reader should turn to Petrukhintsev’s earlier
work cited above.
10 In  a  book of  this  magnitude there is  much to  discuss.  Petrukhintsev sees  the local
variation  of  forms  of  rule  on  the  periphery  of  the  Russian  empire  as  incomplete
integration. That is, he believes the ultimate goal was integration, though at the same
time  he  is  aware  that  the  center  was  (still,  in  his  view)  trying  to  preserve  local
institutions,  as  in  the  Baltic  provinces,  Bashkiria,  or  the  southern  frontier.  Many
historians  of  Russia,  especially  in  the  West,  have  recently  emphasized  that  local
autonomies remained, often to 1917, and that the various efforts at centralization and
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uniformity were aimed only at certain areas like the former Polish provinces and they
were incomplete even there.  Empires,  in this  conception,  are intrinsically  based on
local autonomies and local elites. 
11 Another issue to consider is the character of politics at the court and its relationship to
the central government. Petrukhintsev is very solid on policy formation at the level of
central and local administration, providing a fascinating picture of how projects like
Kirillov’s came into being. He does not, however, systematically investigate the extent
to which court politics influenced these decisions, though he does provide some vivid
examples, such as Biron’s support for Schönberg’s scheme. Kirillov’s main patron seems
to  have  been Ostermann,  but  Petrukhintsev  does  not  go into  detail  about  how his
patronage worked. At one point (744) he asserts that higher politics were a contest
between the Cabinet, which looked out for state interests, and the Senate, with its more
pragmatic but also more pro‑gentry position. This is a theme for another large book.
12 The story of Anna’s reign provided here also throws some light on the much debated
question of the effects of Peter’s measures and the “Westernization” of Russian culture.
Historians  and  publicists  have  often  lamented  the  alleged  superficiality  of  the
acceptance of European culture, but Petrukhintsev, in his accounts of Tatishchev and
Kirillov,  has  given some very  concrete  examples.  Tatishchev  used  what  he  learned
mostly to good effect, building up the mining and metal industries. Kirillov took from
Western culture the notion that the search for treasure justified risky schemes and the
subjection and mishandling of communities that stood in the way. His methods were
not just reprehensible to the modern reader, they also were ineffective, creating more
opposition than the older Russian practice of cooptation and cooperation with local
elites. Two different sides of Russia’s adoption of European culture come out vividly.
13 It is a mark of the quality of Petrukhintsev’s work that it provokes these and other
questions.  Perhaps  it  is  also  inevitable  in  a  work  of  this  size  that  there  are  some
Western and even recent Russian and Ukrainian publications not mentioned that would
have  enriched  the  argument.  Nevertheless,  the  achievement  is  enormous.  He  has
provided many new ideas and a portrait  of  the aims of the Russian state and their
fulfillment in a crucial decade of the eighteenth century that has no equal in depth or
breadth.
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